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Using panel data for 88 developing countries over the period 1975-2004, this paper analyzes 
the way of causality between selected ten macroeconmic variables and IMF credits. The 
causality has been found between IMF credits and macroeconomic indicators in eight out of ten 
cases in the study. Consequently, overall, it can be said that IMF credits (or IMF stabilization 
programs) are worsening the macroeconomic performance of developing countries rather than 
improving their economic problems. 
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The primary role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is to provide credits to 
member countries in balance-of-payments difficulties. The basic conception of the 
IMF’s role, as envisioned at Bretton Woods in 1944, was to promote exchange rate 
stability and provide short-term finance to deal with temporary current account deficits 
in advanced countries. Thus, with the breakdown of the “par adjustable peg system” in 
1973, the IMF lost its major role as the “guarantor of fixed exchange rates” among 
advanced countries. Nevertheless, the IMF did not disappear, and its role expanded 
instead into many new areas. The IMF has now evolved into the “crisis manager” and 
“development financier” for developing countries (See Krueger 1998; Bordo and James, 
2000; for discussions of the changing role of the IMF). In its 64 years of existence, the 
IMF has been criticized because of its institutional structure and lending practices. 
Some argue that the IMF is a bureaucratic and nontransparent institution with no 
accountability for its actions. It has also been suggested that Fund-supported 
stabilization programs are ineffective and may create moral hazard (Dreher and Vaubel, 
2001). 
 
As a result of the IMF supported economic reform programs, many crisis-hit countries 
in the 1990s have temporarily succeeded in achieving macroeconomic stabilization and 
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the existing studies suggest that IMF programs provide a short-run balance of payments 
relief to crisis-hit countries (See Donovan 1982; Doroodian 1993; Conway 1994; 
Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; and Evrensel 2002). This effort however has been 
accompanied by temporary deceleration of real growth and prolonged recession in some 
countries. 
 
Therefore, the IMF-supported macroeconomic stabilizat on programs have been 
criticized substantially in terms of their philosophy, approach, analytical framework, 
program, conditionality and especially, in terms of their impact on the main 
macroeconomic indicators; such as, inflation, balance of payments, current account and 
growth. 
 
There is a huge literature about the macroeconomic effects of IMF programs on the 
macroeconomic performance of developing countries (See Ozturk 2008; Bird 2007; 
Steinwand and Stone 2007; Atoyan and Conway 2006; Barro and Lee 2005; Easterly 
2005; and Przeworski and Vreeland 2000 for the effects of IMF programs on 
macroeconomic variables). Therefore, we will not give any information about the 
effects of IMF programs on macroeconomic variables in this study. Moreover, we will 
study the way of causality between the credits given by IMF and the macroeconomic 
indicators. In other words, we will investigate about whether the macroeconomic 
problems in developing countries are calling for the assistance of IMF or the IMF 
credits create the macroeconomic problems and then call for the assistance of IMF, or 
there is no any relationship between these variables. To our knowledge, no study has 
focused on the causality between IMF credits and macroeconomic indicators in the 
literature.  
 
This paper focuses on the way of causality between IMF credits and selected ten 
macroeconomic aggregates of 88 developing countries by using panel data for the 
period of 1975-2004. The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes 
methodology and data. Section 3 briefs the empirical results and the last section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
The choice of the period rests on the availability of data. Data on macroeconomic 
variables are annually obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI Online, 
World Bank), IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Penn World Data. The 
analysis covers the time period 1975-2004 for 88 developing countries. Countries 
studied in this paper are listed in Table 1. Since some of the data are not available for all 
countries or periods, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations 
depends on the choice of explanatory variables. The macroeconomic variables used in 
the study are: balance of payments (BOP), IMF credits, budget deficit (BD), current 
account balance (CA), per capita GDP (growth), consumption (C), domestic credits 











Table 1  
 
Countries included in the analysis 
 
Algeria  Egypt  Lao Rwanda  
Argentina  El Salvador  Lesotho  Samoa  
Azerbaijan  Ethiopia  Liberia  Senegal  
Bangladesh  Fiji  Madagascar  Sierra Leone  
Belize  Gabon  Malawi  Slovakya 
Benin  Gambia  Malaysia  South Africa  
Bolivia  Georgia  Mali  Sri Lanka  
Brazil  Ghana  Mauritania  Sudan  
Bulgaria  Guatemala  Mauritius  Swaziland  
Burkina Faso  Guinea  Mexico  Tanzania  
Burundi  Guinea Bissau Moldova  Thailand  
Cameroon  Guyana  Morocco  Togo  
Chad  Haiti  Mozambique  Trinidad and Tobago  
Chile  Honduras  Nepal  Tunisia 
China  Hungary  Nicaragua  Turkey  
Comoros  India  Niger  Uganda  
Costa Rica  Indonesia  Pakistan  Ukraine 
Cote d’lvoire Jamaica  Papua New Guinea  Uruguay  
Croatia  Jordan  Peru  Venezuela  
Dominic Kenya  Poland  Yemen  
Dominic Rep. Kongo Dem. Rep. Romania  Zambia  
Ecuador  Kongo Rep. Russian Federation  Zimbabwe  
 
The relationship between IMF credits and selected economic aggregates will be 
performed in two steps. First, we define the order of integration in series by using panel 
unit root tests. Second, we test causality using the Granger causality test. 
 
 
2.1. PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
For the developing countries, heterogeneity arises because of differences in economic 
conditions in each country. Therefore, we employed a homogeneous panel unit root test 
and two heterogeneous panel unit root tests to check whether the variables in our model 
are stationary or non-stationary. These tests are the LLC (Levin et al., 2002), Fisher 
ADF (Choi, 2001) and IPS (Im et al., 2003). While the first one assumes that all 
countries have a common unit root process, the last two tests take heterogeneity into 
account using individual effects and individual linear trends.  
 
Levin et al. (2002) propose a more powerful panel root test than a separate unit root 
tests for each individual time series. The null hypothesis is that all individuals have unit 
root ( 0:0 =αH ) against the alternative that all individuals have stationary process 
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However since ik is unknown Levin et al. therefore suggest a three-step procedure to 
implement LLC test. In step 1, Levin et al. carry out separate ADF regressions for each 
individual in the panel, and generate two orthogalized residuals. Step 2 requires 
estimating the ratio of long–run to short-run innovation standard deviation for each 
individual. In the final step, Levin et al. compute the pooled t-statistics. 
Choi (2001) considers the following model: 
 





imiiit td βββ +++= ...10 , ittiiit uxx += − )1(α  and itu  is integrated of order 
zero. Choi allows each time series ity  to have a different sample size and a different 
specification of nonstochastic and stochastic compenents depending on i. The null 
hypothesis is that all the individual series in the panel are nonstationary ( 0:0 =iH α  for 
all i) and against the alternative of some time series stationary ( 0:0 =iH α  for some 










        (3) 
 
Where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Im et al. (2003) (IPS) 
also developed a unit root test for dynamic heterogneous panels based on the mean of 
individual unit root statistics. Im et al. propose a standardized t-bar test based on the 
ADF statistics averaged across the groups. The stochasti  process, ity , is generated by 
the first-order autoregressive process: 
 
, 1(1 )it i i i i t ity yφ µ φ ε−= − + +    i=1,...N;  t=1,...T    (4) 
 
Where initial values, 0iy , are given. In the testing the null hypothesis of unit roots, 
1iφ =  for all i. Equation (4) can be expressed: 
 
, 1it i i i t ity yα β ε−∆ = + + ,          (5) 
 
The null hypothesis is that each individual series in the panel has a unit root and 
alternative hypothesis allows for iα  to differ across groups: 
 
0 : 0iH β =  for all i        (6) 
1 : 0iH β < ,     1,...,2,1 Ni = ,   0iβ = ,  NNNi ,....,2,1 11 ++=   (7) 
 
The modified standardized IPSt statistic below is distributed as N(0,1) when ∞→T  
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2.2. PANEL GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST 
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where itε  and itv  are error terms.  There are three possible cases of causality testing: If 
the 0jβ = is not rejected then X does not cause Y in the longrun; similarly if the null 
0jδ =  is not rejected Y does not cause X in the long run.Likewise rejection of the null 




3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the results derived from one homogeneous and two heterogeneous 
panel unit root tests for the order of panel integration. Maximum lags based on Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) for these tests and both panel unit root tests have the same 























Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 
Variables LLC Fisher ADF IPS 
 Levels Levels Levels 
IMF -53.358   (6)*** 290.203  (6)*** -6.157   (6)*** 
Budget  deficit -26.692   (5)*** 328.951  (5)*** -8.232   (5)*** 
Per capita GDP -12.296  (6) *** 219.557  (6)** -1.508   (6) * 
Current Account -9.514  (6)*** 458.076  (6)*** -9.794  (6)*** 
Balance of Payments -11.480  (6)*** 491.948  (6)*** -10.880  (6)*** 
Foreign Direct Investment -7.652  (6)*** 447..913 (6)*** -7.236  (6)*** 
Consumption -5.967  (6)*** 473.980  (6)*** -6.048  (6)*** 
Inflation -601.432  (6)*** 583.285  (6)*** -77.152  (6)*** 
Investment -7.835  (6)*** 358.081  (6)*** -7.626  (6)*** 
Real Exchange Rate -14.734  (6)*** 450.231  (6)*** -9.103  (6)*** 
Domestic Credits -8.868  (6)*** 306.640  (6)*** -6.880  (6)*** 
Note: Maximum lags in ( ). 
 ***, **, and *  denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3 shows the Granger causality (1969) test results that analyze the relationship 
between IMF credits and selected macroeconomic indicators of developing countries. 
To determine the optimal interval lag, there are some methods like Akaike’s and 
Schwartz’s in the econometric literature. However, in the study of Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (1991), instead of selecting the optimal lag, they found that the results will be 
better and more accurate if you try for few optimal lags to see whether they are sensitive 
to lag length or not. Thus, the Granger F-values ar c lculated with three different lag 




























Granger Causality Test Results 
 
 Obs. F–Statistic F–Statistic F-Statistic  
Null Hypothesis  Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Conclusion 
1- IMF and Balance of Payments (BOP) 2054     
IMF does not Granger cause BOP  0.36 0.48 0.59 BOP ⇒ IMF 
BOP does not Granger cause IMF   3.40* 0.17 0.39  
2- IMF and Budget Deficit  (BD) 1498     
IMF does not Granger cause BD  3.0* 1.47 1.86 IMF ⇒ BD 
BD does not Granger cause IMF   30.92 10.46 7.97  
3- IMF and Current Account Balance (CA) 2017     
IMF does not Granger cause CA  5.11** 3.43** 2.24* IMF ⇔ CA 
CA does not Granger cause IMF   9.13*** 4.6*** 2.83**  
4- IMF and Per Capita GDP (Capita) 2291     
IMF does not Granger cause CAPITA  0.04 0.008 0.11  
CAPITA does not Granger cause IMF   1.33 2.35* 1.60 CAPITA ⇒ IMF 
5- IMF and Consumption (C) 2150     
IMF does not Granger cause C  6.01** 1.64 0.74 IMF ⇒ C 
C does not Granger cause IMF   0.46 0.18 0.28  
6- IMF and Domestic Credits (DC) 2207     
IMF does not Granger cause DC  35.81 419.00 239.7 DC ⇒ IMF 
DC does not Granger cause IMF   22.72 5.27*** 3.27**  
7- IMF and Foreign Direct Investment  (FDI) 1904     
IMF does not Granger cause FDI  0.95 0.83 2.12* IMF ⇔ FDI 
FDI does not Granger cause IMF   8.88*** 1.94 3.05**  
8- IMF and Inflation  (INF) 2034     
IMF does not Granger cause INF  0.08 1.57 1.13 IMF ….. INF 
INF does not Granger cause IMF   0.64 0.10 0.33  
9- IMF and Investment (I) 2174     
IMF does not Granger cause I  3.06* 0.70 0.60 IMF ⇔ I 
I does not Granger cause IMF   3.45* 2.14 3.46**  
10- IMF and Real Exchange Rate (RER) 987     
IMF does not Granger cause RER  0.49 0.23 0.14 IMF ….. RER 
RER does not Granger cause IMF   0.02 0.02 0.01  
Note:  ***, **, and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
As it can be seen in Table 3, the test results are concluded with arrow signs. One-way 
arrows show one-way causality, two-ways arrows show two-way causality and dots 
show no causality between the variables. In case of balance of payments (BOP) and 
IMF, there is a causality running from BOP to IMF. In other words, the developments 
or changes in BOP of developing countries will call for IMF assistance. Therefore, 
when there is a BOP deficit, the IMF credits will be used by these countries. On the 
other hand, in case of IMF and budget deficits (BD), the causality runs from IMF to BD. 
This shows that IMF credits create some changes (or problems) in the budget balance of 
related countries. However, there is bidirectional (two-way) causality between IMF 
credits and current account balance (CA). In case of IMF and inflation (INF),  and IMF 
and real exchange rate (RER), no causality is found. It means there is no relationship 
between these variables. The causality between IMF and selected ten variables are 








This paper analyzes the causality between selected macroeconomic variables and IMF 
credits using panel data for 88 developing countries over the period of 1975-2004. We 
investigated about whether the macroeconomic problems in developing countries are 
calling for the assistance of IMF or it is the IMF credits that create the macroeconomic 
problems which then call for the assistance of IMF, or there is no relationship between 
these variables. 
 
The findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: i) the causality runs from IMF 
to budget deficit and consumption, ii) the causality runs from per capita income, 
domestic credits and balance of payments to IMF, iii) there is two-way (bidirectional) 
causality between IMF and foreign direct investment, IMF and investment, and IMF 
and current account balance, and iv) no causality is found between IMF and inflation, 
and IMF and real exchange rate. Consequently, overall, it can be said that IMF credits 
(or IMF stabilization programs) are worsening the macroeconomic performance of 
developing countries rather than improving their economic problems. In other words, 
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KAUZALNOST IZME ðU MMF-ovih KREDITA I MAKROEKONOMSKIH 





Koristeći panel podatke 88 zemalja u razvoju u periodu od 1975. do 2004., rad analizira 
kauzalnost izmeñu  deset odabranih makroekonomskih varijabli i kredita MMF-a. Kauzalnost 
MMF-ovih kredita i makroekonomskih indikatora je pronañena u osam od deset slučajeva 
obuhvaćenih istraživanjem. Stoga se može zaključiti da krediti MMF-a (ili MMF-ovi 
stabilizacijski programi) više pogoršavaju makroekonomske performanse zemalja u razvoju 
nego što umanjuju njihove ekonomske probleme. 
 
JEL: E63, F33, F34, N1, O19, C33 
 
Ključne riječi: MMF, zemlje u razvoju, jedinični korijeni vremenskih presjeka, Grangerov test 
kauzalnosti 
 
 
